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All usThis paper presents a model of a monetary economy where there are
differences in liquidity across assets. Money circulates because it ismore
liquid than other assets, not because it has any special function. The
model is used to investigate how aggregate activity and asset prices fluc-
tuate with shocks to productivity and liquidity and to examine what role
government policy might have through open-market operations that
change the mix of assets held by the private sector.I. IntroductionThis paper presents a model of a monetary economy where there are dif-
ferences in liquidity across assets. Our aim is to study how aggregate activity
and asset prices fluctuatewith shocks toproductivity and liquidity. Indoinge first version of this paper was presented as a plenary address to the 2001 Society forEco-
c Dynamics Meeting in Stockholm and then as a Clarendon Lecture at the University
ford (Kiyotaki and Moore 2001). We are grateful for feedback from many conference
eminar participants. In particular, we thank Olivier Blanchard, Markus Brunnermeier,
Chari, Marco Del Negro, Edward Green, Bengt Holmstrom, Olivier Jeanne, Arvind
namurthy, Narayana Kocherlakota, Guido Lorenzoni, Robert Lucas, KiminoriMatsuyama,
McGrattan, Shouyong Shi, JonathanThomas, Robert Townsend, Neil Wallace, Randall
t, and Ruilin Zhou for very helpful discussions and criticisms. We also thank Robert
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Allso, we examine what role government policy might have through open-
market operations that change the mix of assets held by the private sector.
Part of our purpose is to construct a workhorse model of money and li-
quidity that does not stray too far from the other workhorse of modern
macroeconomics, the real business cycle model. We thus maintain the as-
sumption of competitive markets. In a standard competitive framework,
money has no role unless endowed with a special function—for example,
that the purchase of goods requires cash in advance. In our model, the
reason why money can improve resource allocation is not because money
has a special function but because, crucially, we assume that other assets
are partially illiquid, less liquid than money. Ours might be thought of as
a liquidity-in-advance framework.
Illiquidity has to do with some impediment to the resale of assets. With
this inmind, we construct a model in which the resale of assets is a central
feature of the economy. We consider a group of entrepreneurs who each
uses his or her own capital stock and skill to produce output from labor
(which is suppliedbyworkers). Capital depreciates and is restocked through
investment, but the investment technology for producing new capital from
output is not commonly available: in each period only some of the entre-
preneurs are able to invest, and the arrival of investment opportunities is
randomly distributed across entrepreneurs through time. Hence, in each
period there is a need to channel funds from those entrepreneurs who do
not have an investment opportunity (that period’s savers) to those who do
(that period’s investors).
To acquire funds for the production of new capital, an investing entre-
preneur issues equity claims to the capital’s future returns. However, we as-
sume that because the investing entrepreneur’s skill will be needed to pro-
duce these future returns and he cannot precommit to work, at the time of
investment he can credibly pledge only a fraction—say, v—of the future re-
turns from the new capital. Unless v is high enough, he faces a borrow-
ing constraint: hemust financepart of the cost of investment fromhis avail-
able resources. The lower the v, the tighter the borrowing constraint and
the larger the downpayment per unit of investment that hemustmake out
of his own funds.
He will typically have on his balance sheet two kinds of asset that can be
resold to raise funds. He may have money, and he may have equity previ-
ously issued by other entrepreneurs. Both of these will have been acquired
by him at some point in the past, when he himself was a saver.Shimer, Harald Uhlig, and two anonymous referees for thoughtful comments. We express
our special gratitude to Wei Cui for his excellent research assistance. Kiyotaki acknowledges
financial support from the US National Science Foundation, and Moore acknowledges fi-
nancial support from the Leverhulme Trust, the European Research Council, and the UK
Economic and Social Research Council.
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liquidity, business cycles, and monetary policy 000Crucially, we suppose that equity is less liquid than money. We parame-
terize the degree to which equity is illiquid by making a stylized assump-
tion: in eachperiod only a proportion—say,f—of an agent’s equity holding
can be resold. Although the entrepreneur with an investment opportunity
this period can readily divestf of his equity holding, to divest anymore he
will have towait until next period, by which time the opportunitymay have
disappeared. The lower the f, the tighter the resalability constraint. Un-
like his equity holding, the entrepreneur’s money holding is perfectly liq-
uid: it can all be used to buy goods straightaway.
In practice, of course, there are wide differences in resalability across
different kinds of equity: compare the stock of publicly traded companies
with shares in privately held businesses. Indeed, there are many financial
assets that are hardly any less liquid than money—for example, govern-
ment bonds. Thus, in our stylized model, “money” should be interpreted
very broadly to include all financial assets that are essentially as liquid as
money. Under the heading of “equity” come all financial assets that are
less than perfectly liquid. By assumption, all these nonmonetary assets are
subject to the common resalability constraint parameterized by f.
To understand how fiat money can lubricate this economy, notice that
the task of channeling funds from those entrepreneurs who do not have
an investment opportunity into the hands of those who do is thwarted by
the fact that investing entrepreneurs are unable to offer savers adequate
compensation: the borrowing constraint (v) means that new capital in-
vestment cannot be entirely self-financed by issuing new equity, and the
resalability constraint (f) means that enough of the old equity cannot
change hands quickly. Fiat money can help alleviate this problem. Our
analysis shows that if v and f are not high enough—if (and only if) a par-
ticular combination of v and f lies below a certain threshold—then the cir-
culation of fiat money, passing each period from investors to savers in ex-
change for goods, serves to boost aggregate activity. Whenever fiat money
plays this essential role, we say that the economy is a monetary economy.
Whether agents use fiat money—whether the economy is monetary—is
determined endogenously.
We show that in a monetary economy, the expected rate of return on
money is low, less than the expected rate of return on equity. (The steady
state of an economy where the stock of fiat money is fixed would necessar-
ily have a zero net return onmoney.) Nevertheless, a saver chooses to hold
somemoney in his portfolio, because in the event that he has an opportu-
nity to invest in the future he will be liquidity constrained, and money is
more liquid than equity. The gap between the return on money and the
return on equity is a liquidity premium.
We also show that both of the returns on equity and money are lower
than the rate of time preference. This is because borrowing constraints
starve the economy of means of saving—too little equity can be crediblyThis content downloaded from 129.215.019.157 on November 08, 2019 02:35:05 AM
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Allpledged—which raises asset prices and lowers yields. As a consequence,
agents who never have investment opportunities, such as the workers,
choose to hold neither equity nor money. Assuming workers cannot bor-
row against their future labor income, we show that they simply consume
their wage, period by period. This may help explain why certain house-
holds neither save nor participate in asset markets. It is not that they do
not have access to those markets or that they are particularly impatient
but rather that the return on assets is not enough to attract them.1
In our v-f framework, v and f are exogenous parameters. Although the
borrowing constraint (v) and the resalability constraint (f) might both
be thought of as varieties of liquidity constraint,2 in this paper we are es-
pecially concerned with the effects of shocks to f, which we identify as li-
quidity shocks. We are motivated here by the fact that in the recent finan-
cial turmoil many assets—such as asset-backed securities and auction-rate
securities—that used to be highly liquid becamemuch less resalable.3 Even
though we focus on shocks to f, it is important to recognize that v is an es-
sential component of the model. Were v to be sufficiently close to one,
then new capital investment could be self-financed by issuing new equity
and there would be no need for old equity to circulate (reminiscent of the
idea that in the Arrow-Debreu framework markets need open only once,
at an initial date); liquidity shocks—shocks to f—would have no effect.
Themechanismbywhich liquidity shocks affect ourmonetary economy
is absent from most real business cycle models. In our model, there are
critical feedbacks from asset prices to aggregate activity. Consider a per-
sistent liquidity shock: suppose f falls and is anticipated to recover only
slowly. The impact of this fall in resalability is to shrink the funds available
to investors to use as down payment. Further, anticipating lower future
resalability, the price of equity falls relative to the value of money—think
of this as a “flight to liquidity”—which tends to raise the size of the re-
quired down payment per unit of investment. All in all, via these feedback
mechanisms, investment falls as f falls. Asset prices and aggregate activity
are vulnerable to liquidity shocks, unlike in a standard general equilibrium
asset pricing model.1 The model can be extended to show that if workers face idiosyncratic shocks to spend-
ing needs, then they may save but only use money to do so.
2 Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) use “funding liquidity” to refer to the borrowing
constraint and “market liquidity” to refer to the resalability constraint.
3 In our first presentations of this research (see, e.g., Kiyotaki and Moore [2001]), al-
though we separately identified the borrowing and resalability constraints, for analytical
convenience we set f 5 v. However, it helps to keep f distinct from v, as we do in the cur-
rent paper, because we are thus able to pin down the effects of shocks to f and identify a
monetary policy that can be used in response. We made use of the v-f framework in other
papers, though sometimes with different notation (Kiyotaki and Moore 2002, 2003, 2005a,
2005b).
This content downloaded from 129.215.019.157 on November 08, 2019 02:35:05 AM
 use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
liquidity, business cycles, and monetary policy 000Our basic model, presented in Sections II and III, has a fixed stock of
fiat money. Government is introduced in the full model of Section IV,
which examines monetary policy. How might government, through inter-
ventions by the central bank, ameliorate the effects of liquidity shocks?
Specifically, how might policy change behavior in the private economy?
The central bank can buy and hold private equity—presuming that the
central bank does not violate the private sector resalability constraint. An
open-market operation to purchase equity by issuing fiat money shifts
up the ratio of the values of money to equity held by the private sector
(see Metzler 1951). Investing entrepreneurs are in a position to invest
more when their portfolios are more liquid. In effect, the government
improves liquidity in the private economy by taking relatively illiquid as-
sets onto its own books, thereby boosting aggregate activity. This uncon-
ventional form of monetary policy has been employed by central banks
around the world in recent years to ease the global financial crisis and
appears to have met with some success; see, for example, Del Negro et. al.
(2017). Interventions by the central bank have real effects in our economy
because they operate across a liquidity margin—the difference in liquid-
ity between money and equity. With its emphasis on liquidity rather than
sticky prices, our framework harks back to an earlier interpretation of
Keynes (1936), following Tobin (1969).
Beforewe come to this policy analysis, it helps to start with thebasicmodel
without government.We relate our paper to the literature andmake some
final remarks in Section V. Proofs are contained in the appendix.II. Basic Model without GovernmentConsider an infinite-horizon, discrete-time economywith four objects traded:
a nondurable output, labor, equity, and fiat money. Fiat money is intrinsically
useless and is infixed supplyM in thebasicmodelof this and thenext section.
There are two populations of agents, entrepreneurs and workers, each
with unitmeasure. Let us start with the entrepreneurs, who are the central
actors in the drama. At date t, a typical entrepreneur has expected dis-
counted utility
Eto
∞
s5t
bs2tu csð Þ (1)
of consumption path fct , ct11, ct12, :::g, where uðcÞ 5 log c and 0 < b < 1.
He has no labor endowment. All entrepreneurs have access to a constant-
returns-to-scale technology for producing output from capital and labor.
An entrepreneur holding kt capital at the start of period t can employ ℓt
labor to produce
yt 5 Atkt
g‘t
12g (2)This content downloaded from 129.215.019.157 on November 08, 2019 02:35:05 AM
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Alloutput, where 0 < g < 1. Production is completed within the period t,
during which time capital depreciates to lkt, 0 < l < 1. We assume that
the productivity parameterAt > 0, which is common to all entrepreneurs,
follows a stationary stochastic process. Given that each entrepreneur can
employ labor at a competitive real wage rate, wt, gross profit is propor-
tional to the capital stock:
yt 2 wt‘t 5 rtkt , (3)
where, as we will see, gross profit per unit of capital, rt, depends on pro-
ductivity, aggregate capital stock, and labor supply.
The entrepreneurmay also have an opportunity to produce new capital.
Specifically, at each date t, with probability p he has access to a constant-
returns technology that produces it units of capital from it units of output.
The arrival of such an investment opportunity is independently distributed
across entrepreneurs and through time and is independent of aggregate
shocks. Again, investment is completed within the period t—although
newly produced capital does not become available as an input to the pro-
duction of output until the following period, t 1 1:
kt11 5 lkt 1 it : (4)
We assume there is no insurance market against having an investment
opportunity.4 We also make a regularity assumption that the subjective
discount factor is larger than the fraction of capital left after production
(one minus the depreciation rate):
Assumption 1. b > l.
This mild restriction is not essential but will make the distribution of cap-
ital and asset holdings across individual entrepreneurs well behaved.
To finance the cost of investment, the entrepreneur who has an invest-
ment opportunity can issue equity claims to the future returns fromnewly
produced capital. Normalize one unit of equity at date t to be a claim to
the future returns from one unit of investment at date t: it pays rt11 output
at date t 1 1, lrt12 at date t 1 2, l
2rt13 at date t 1 3, and so on.
We make two critical assumptions. First, the entrepreneur who pro-
duces new capital cannot fully precommit to work with it, even though
his specific skills will be needed for it to produce output. To capture this
lack of commitment power in a simple way, we assume that an investing4 This assumption can be justified in a variety of ways. For example, it may not be pos-
sible to verify that someone has an investment opportunity, or verification may take so long
that the opportunity has gone by the time the claim is paid out. A long-term insurance con-
tract based on self-reporting will not fully work if people are able to save covertly. Each of
these justifications warrants formal modeling. But we are reasonably confident that even if
partial insurance were possible, our broad conclusions would still hold. So rather than clut-
ter up the model, we simply assume that no insurance scheme is feasible.
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liquidity, business cycles, and monetary policy 000entrepreneur can credibly pledge at most a fraction v < 1 of the future re-
turns.5 Loosely put, we are assuming that only a fraction v of the new cap-
ital can be mortgaged.
We take v to be an exogenous parameter: the fraction of new capital
returns that can be issued as equity at the time of investment. The smaller
the v, the tighter the borrowing constraint that an investing entrepreneur
faces. To meet the cost of investment, he has to use any money that he
mayhold and raise further funds by—as far as possible—reselling anyhold-
ing of other entrepreneurs’ equity that hemay have accumulated through
past purchases.
The second critical assumption is that entrepreneurs cannot dispose
of their equity holdings as quickly as money. Again, to capture this idea
in a simple way, we assume that before the investment opportunity disap-
pears, the investing entrepreneur can resell only a fraction ft < 1 of his
holding of other entrepreneurs’ equity. (He can use all of his ownmoney.)
This is tantamount to assuming a peculiar transaction cost per period:
zero for the first fraction ft of equity sold and then infinity.6
Like v, we take ft to be an exogenous parameter: the fraction of equity
holdings that can be resold in each period. The smaller the ft, the less
liquid the equity and the tighter the resalability constraint.
We suppose that the aggregate productivity At and the liquidity of eq-
uity ft jointly follow a stationary Markov process in the neighborhood of
the constant unconditional mean ðA, fÞ. A shock to At is a productivity
shock, and a shock to ft is a liquidity shock. (We do not shock v, which
is why it does not have a subscript.)
In general, an entrepreneur has three kinds of asset in his portfolio:
money, his holding of other entrepreneurs’ equity, and the uncommitted
fraction, 1 2 v, of the returns from his own capital, which might loosely
be termed “unmortgaged capital stock”—own capital stock minus own
equity issued.
Balance sheet
Money holding Own equity issued
Holding of other entrepreneurs’ equity Net worth
Own capital stock5 Compare with Hart and Moore (1994), where the borrowing constr
a consequence of the fact that the human capital of the agent who is r
the investing entrepreneur—is inalienable.
6 One way to endogenize ft is to make use of a search and matching f
and Radde (2016).
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Allinteraction between the distribution of asset holdings across the entre-
preneurs and their choices of consumption, investment, and portfolio.
Thus, wemake a simplifying assumption: in every period, we suppose that
an entrepreneur can issue new equity against a fraction ft of any uncom-
mitted returns from his old capital—in loose terms, he can mortgage a
fraction ft of any as yet unmortaged capital stock.7 Think of mortgaging
old capital stock—or reselling equity—as akin to peeling an onion slowly,
layer by layer, a fraction ft in each period t.
The upshot of this assumption is that an entrepreneur’s holding of
others’ equity and his unmortgaged capital stock are perfect substitutes
as means of saving for him: both pay the same return stream per unit
(rt11 at date t 1 1, lrt12 at date t 1 2, l
2rt13 at date t 1 3, etc.), and up
to a fraction ft of both can be resold or mortgaged per period. In effect,
by making the simplifying assumption, we have reduced the number of
assets that we need to keep track of to two: besides money, the holdings
of other entrepreneurs’ equity (outside equity) and the unmortgaged
capital stock (inside equity) can be lumped together as simply “equity.”
Let nt be the equity and mt the money held by an individual entrepre-
neur at the start of period t. He faces two liquidity constraints:
nt11 ≥ 1 2 vð Þit 1 1 2 ftð Þlnt (5)
and
mt11 ≥ 0: (6)
During the period, the entrepreneur who invests it can issue at most vit
equity against the new capital, and he can dispose of at most a fraction ft
of his equity holding after depreciation. Inequality (5) brings these con-
straints together: his equity holding at the start of period t 1 1 must be
at least 1 2 v times investment plus 1 2 ft times depreciated equity. In-
equality (6) says that his money holding cannot be negative.
Let qt be the price of equity in terms of output, the numeraire; qt is also
equal to Tobin’s q : the ratio of the market value of capital to the replace-
ment cost. Let pt be the price of money. (Warning—pt is customarily de-
fined as the inverse: the price of output in terms of money. But a priori
money may not have value, so it is better not to make it the numeraire.)
The entrepreneur’s flow-of-funds constraint at date t is then given by
ct 1 it 1 qt nt11 2 it 2 lntð Þ 1 pt mt11 2 mtð Þ 5 rtnt : (7)
The left-hand side is his expenditure on consumption, investment, and
net purchases of equity and money. The right-hand side is his dividend7 One reason may be that with age, capital becomes less specific to the producing entre-
preneur so that he can credibly commit to pay more of the output from older capital.
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liquidity, business cycles, and monetary policy 000income, which is proportional to his holding of equity at the start of
this period.
Turn now to the workers. Because there is noheterogeneity amongwork-
ers and the population of workers is unity, we consider a representative
worker. At date t, the representative worker has expected discounted utility
Eto
∞
s5t
bs2tU Cws 2
q
1 1 n
Lsð Þ11n
h i
(8)
of paths of consumption fCwt , Cwt11, Cwt12, :::g and labor supply fLt , Lt11,
Lt12, :::g, where q > 0, n > 0, and U[⋅] is increasing and strictly concave.
If the worker starts date t holding N wt equity andMwt money, her flow-of-
funds constraint is
Cwt 1 qt N
w
t11 2 lN
w
tð Þ 1 pt Mwt11 2 Mwtð Þ 5 wtLt 1 rtN wt : (9)
The consumption expenditure and net purchase of equity and money in
the left-hand side are financed by wage and dividend income in the right-
hand side. Workers, who do not have investment opportunities, face the
same resalability constraints as entrepreneurs and cannot borrow against
their future labor income:
N wt11 ≥ 1 2 ftð ÞlN wt ≥ 0 and Mwt11 ≥ 0: (10)
An equilibrium process of prices fpt , qt , wtg is such that entrepreneurs
choose labor demand lt to maximize gross profit (3) subject to the pro-
duction function (2) for a given start-of-period capital stock and choose
consumption, investment, capital stock, and start-of-next-period equity
and money holdings fct , it , kt11, nt11,mt11g to maximize (1) subject to (4)–
(7); workers choose consumption, labor supply, equity, and money hold-
ing fCwt , Lt ,N wt11,Mwt11g to maximize (8) subject to (9) and (10); and the
markets for output, labor, equity, and money all clear.
Before we characterize equilibrium, it helps to clear the decks a little
by suppressing reference to the workers. Given that their population has
unit measure, it follows from (8) and (9) that their aggregate labor supply
equals ðwt=qÞ1=n. Maximizing the gross profit of a typical entrepreneur
with capital kt, we find his labor demand, kt ½ð1 2 gÞAt=wt 1=g, which is pro-
portional to kt. So if the aggregate stock of capital at the start of date t isKt,
labor market clearing requires that
wt=qð Þ1=n 5 Kt 1 2 gð ÞAt=wt½ 1=g :
Substituting the equilibrium wage wt back into the left-hand side of (3),
we find that the individual entrepreneur’s maximized gross profit equals
rtkt, where
rt 5 at Ktð Þa21, (11)This content downloaded from 129.215.019.157 on November 08, 2019 02:35:05 AM
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Alland the parameters at and a are derived from At, g, q, and n:
at 5 g
1 2 g
q
  12gð Þ= g1nð Þ
Atð Þ 11nð Þ= g1nð Þ,
a 5
g 1 1 nð Þ
g 1 n
:
(12)
Note from (12) that a lies between 0 and 1, so that rt—which is parametric
for the individual entrepreneur—declines with the aggregate stock of
capitalKt, because the wage increases with Kt. But for the entrepreneurial
sector as a whole, gross profit rtKt increases withKt. Also note from(12) that
rt is increasing in the productivity parameter At through at. Below, we show
that in the neighborhood of the steady-state monetary equilibrium, the
worker will choose to hold neither money nor equity. That is, in aggregate,
workers simply consume their labor income at each date:
Cwt 5 wtLt 5
1 2 g
g
at Ktð Þa: (13)
The ratio of total wage income to capital income is 1 2 g : g, given the
Cobb-Douglas production function.
We arenow in a position to characterize the equilibriumbehavior of the
entrepreneurs. Consider an entrepreneur holding equity nt andmoneymt
at the start of period t. First, suppose he has an investment opportunity:
let this be denoted by a superscript i on his choice of consumption and
start-of-next-period equity and money holdings, ðcit , nit11,mit11Þ. He has two
ways of acquiring equity nit11: either produce it at unit cost 1 or buy it in
the market at price qt. (See the left-hand side of the flow-of-funds con-
straint [7], where, recall, it corresponds to investment.) If qt is less than 1,
the agent will not invest. If qt equals 1, he will be indifferent. If qt is greater
than 1, he will invest by selling as much equity as he can subject to con-
straint (5). The entrepreneur’s production choice is similar to Tobin’s q
theory of investment.
Consider first the economy without aggregate uncertainty, to inquire
under what conditions the first best is achieved. (All proofs are in the
appendix.)
Claim 1. Suppose ðAt , ftÞ 5 ðA, fÞ for all t. Suppose further that v
and f satisfy condition 1:
Condition 1. ð1 2 lÞv 1 plf > ð1 2 lÞð1 2 pÞ.
Then there exists a deterministic steady state in which all the aggre-
gate variables are constant and
a. the allocation of resources is first best;
b. Tobin’s q is equal to unity: q 5 1;This content downloaded from 129.215.019.157 on November 08, 2019 02:35:05 AM
 use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
liquidity, business cycles, and monetary policy 000c. money has no value: p 5 0; and
d. the gross profit rate equals the time preference rate plus the de-
preciation rate: r 5 ½ð1=bÞ 2 1 1 ð1 2 lÞ 5 ð1=bÞ 2 l :
The intuition behind claim 1 is that if the investing entrepreneurs
can issue new equity relatively freely and/or existing equity is relatively
liquid—if condition 1 is satisfied—then the equity market is able to trans-
fer enough resources from the savers to the investing entrepreneurs to
achieve the first-best allocation.8 There is no advantage to having invest-
ment opportunity; Tobin’s q is equal to 1 (the market value of capital is
equal to the replacement cost), and both investing entrepreneurs and sav-
ers earn the same net rate of return on equity, equal to the time prefer-
ence rate. Because the economy achieves the first-best allocation without
money, money has no value.
We now consider the economy with aggregate uncertainty: the aggre-
gate productivity and the liquidity of equity ðAt , ftÞ follow a stochastic
process in the neighborhood of constant ðA, fÞ. Under condition 1, a
continuity argument could be used to show that there is a recursive com-
petitive equilibrium in the neighborhood of this first-best deterministic
steady state, in which Tobin’s q equals unity (qt 5 1) and money has no
value (pt 5 0). Since our primary interest is in monetary equilibria, we
omit the details.
To ensure that qt is strictly greater than 1 and money has value in equi-
librium, we assume that v and f satisfy assumption 2:
Assumption 2. 0 < Fðv, fÞ, where
F v, fð Þ; plb2 1 2 pð Þ 1 2 fð Þ 1 2 lð Þ 1 2 pð Þ 2 1 2 lð Þv 2 plf½ 
1 b2lð Þ 12 pð Þ2 12 lð Þv2plf½  12 lð Þ 12 vð Þ1pl 12fð Þ½ 
 l 1 2 bð Þ 1 2 pð Þ 1 1 2 lð Þv 1 l b 1 p 2 pbð Þf½ :
Observe that all the brackets in the right-hand side are positive, except for
the terms ð1 2 lÞð1 2 pÞ 2 ð1 2 lÞv 2 plf and ðb 2 lÞð1 2 pÞ 2 ð1 2
lÞv2plf. Thus, a sufficient condition for assumption 2 is
1 2 lð Þv 1 plf < b 2 lð Þ 1 2 pð Þ,8 In steady state, aggregate saving (which equals aggregate investment) is equal to the
depreciation of capital. The right-hand side of condition 1 is the ratio of the aggregate sav-
ing of the (fraction 1 2 p) noninvesting entrepreneurs to the aggregate capital stock in
first best. The left-hand side is the ratio of the equity issued or resold by the investing en-
trepreneurs to the aggregate capital stock: ð1 2 lÞv corresponds to new equity issued, and
plf corresponds to old equity resold by the (fraction p) investing entrepreneurs. Thus,
condition 1 says that the equity issued or resold by the investing entrepreneurs is enough
to shift the aggregate saving of the noninvesting entrepreneurs.
This content downloaded from 129.215.019.157 on November 08, 2019 02:35:05 AM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
000 journal of political economy
Alland a necessary condition is
1 2 lð Þv 1 plf < 1 2 lð Þ 1 2 pð Þ:
Notice that if condition 1 in claim 1 were satisfied, then this necessary
condition would not hold.
Claim 2. Under assumptions 1 and 2, there exists a deterministic
steady-state equilibrium for constant ðA, fÞ in which money has value.
In the neighborhood of such a steady-state equilibrium, there is a recur-
sive equilibrium for stochastic ðAt , ftÞ such that
a. the price of money, pt, is strictly positive;
b. the price of capital, qt, is strictly greater than 1 but strictly less than
1=v; and
c. an entrepreneur with an investment opportunity faces binding li-
quidity constraints and will choose not to hold money: mit11 5 0.We will be in a position to prove the claim once we have laid out the
equilibrium conditions—we use a method of guess and verify in the fol-
lowing. For completeness, it should be pointed out that for intermediate
values of v and f that satisfy neither assumption 2 nor condition 1, we can
show thatmoney has no value even though the liquidity constraint (5) still
binds. To streamline the paper, we have chosen not to give an exhaustive
account of the equilibria throughout the parameter space.
There is a caveat to claim 2a. Fiat money can be valuable to someone
only if other people find it valuable; hence, there is always a nonmonetary
equilibrium in which the price of fiatmoney is zero.When there is amon-
etary equilibrium in addition to the nonmonetary equilibrium, we re-
strict attention to the monetary equilibrium: pt > 0.9 Claim 2c says that
the entrepreneur prefers investment with themaximum leverage to hold-
ing money, even though the return is in the form of equity that is less
liquid than money at date t 1 1. (Incidentally, even though the investing
entrepreneurs do not want to hold money for liquidity purposes, the
noninvesting entrepreneurs do—see below. This is why claim 2a holds.)
Thus, for an investing entrepreneur, the liquidity constraints (5) and
(6) both bind. His flow-of-funds constraint (7) can be rewritten as
cit 1 1 2 vqtð Þit 5 rt 1 lftqtð Þnt 1 ptmt : (14)
To finance investment it, the entrepreneur issues equity vit at price qt.
Thus, the second term in the left-hand side is the investment cost that
has to be financed internally: the down payment for investment. The left-
hand side equals the total liquidity needs of the investing entrepreneur.9 This is connected to the literature on rational bubbles; e.g., Santos andWoodford (1997).
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liquidity, business cycles, and monetary policy 000The right-hand side corresponds to the maximum liquidity supplied from
dividends, sales of the resalable fractionof equity after depreciation, and the
value of money. Solving this flow-of-funds constraint with respect to the
equity of the next period, we obtain
cit 1 q
R
t n
i
t11 5 rtnt 1 ft qt 1 1 2 ftð ÞqRt½ lnt 1 ptmt , (15)
where
qRt ;
1 2 vqt
1 2 v
< 1,  as qt > 1: (16)
The value of qRt is the effective replacement cost of equity to the investing
entrepreneur: because he needs a down payment 1 2 vqt for every unit of
investment of which he retains 1 2 v inside equity, he needs ð1 2 vqtÞ=
ð1 2 vÞ to acquire one unit of inside equity. The right-hand side of (15)
is his net worth: gross dividend plus the value of his depreciated equity
lnt—of which the resalable fraction ft is valued at market price and the
nonresalable fraction 1 2 ft is valued by the effective replacement cost—
plus the value of money.
Given the discounted logarithmic preferences (1), the entrepreneur
saves a fraction b of his net worth and consumes a fraction 1 2 b:10
cit 5 1 2 bð Þ rtnt 1 ftqt 1 1 2 ftð ÞqRt½ lnt 1 ptmtf g: (17)
And so, from (14) we obtain an expression for his investment in period t:
it 5
rt 1 lft qtð Þnt 1 ptmt 2 cit
1 2 vqt
: (18)
Investment is equal to the ratio of liquidity available after consumption
to the required down payment per unit of investment.
Next, suppose that the entrepreneur does not have an investment op-
portunity; denote this by a superscript s to stand for a saver. The flow-of-
funds constraint (7) reduces to
cst 1 qtn
s
t11 1 ptm
s
t11 5 rtnt 1 qtlnt 1 ptmt : (19)
For themoment, let us assume that constraints (5) and (6) donot bind for
savers. Then the right-hand side of (19) corresponds to the saver’s net
worth. It is the same as the right-hand side of (15), except that now his de-
preciated equity is valued at the market price qt. From this net worth, he
consumes a fraction 1 2 b:
cst 5 1 2 bð Þ rtnt 1 qtlnt 1 ptmtð Þ: (20)10 Compare (1) to a Cobb-Douglas utility function, where the expenditure share of present
consumption out of total wealth is constant and equal to 1=ð1 1 b 1 b2 1 :::Þ 5 1 2 b.
This content downloaded from 129.215.019.157 on November 08, 2019 02:35:05 AM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
000 journal of political economy
AllNote that consumption of a saver is larger than consumption of an invest-
ing entrepreneur if both hold the same equity and money at the start of
the period. For the saver, his remaining funds are split across a portfolio
of mst11 and n
s
t11.
To determine the optimal portfolio, consider the choice of sacrificing
one unit of consumption ct to purchase either 1=pt units of money or 1=qt
units of equity, which are then used to augment consumption at date
t 1 1. The first-order condition is
u0 ctð Þ 5 Et pt11
pt
b 1 2 pð Þu0 cst11ð Þ 1 pu0 cit11ð Þ½ 
 
5 1 2 pð ÞEt rt11 1 lqt11
qt
bu0 cst11ð Þ
 
1 pEt
rt11 1 lft11qt11 1 l 1 2 ft11ð ÞqRt11
qt
bu0 cit11ð Þ
 
:
(21)
The right-hand side of the first line of (21) is the expected gain from
holding 1=pt additional units of money at date t 1 1: money always yields
pt11, which will proportionately increase utility by u0ðcst11Þ when he does
not have a date t 1 1 investment opportunity (probability 1 2 p) and
by u0ðcit11Þ when he does (probability p). The second line is the expected
gain from holding 1=qt additional units of equity at date t 1 1. Per unit,
this additional equity yields rt11 dividend plus its depreciated value. With
probability 1 2 p that the entrepreneur does not have a date t 1 1 in-
vestment opportunity, the depreciated equity is valued at the market
price qt11, and these yields increase utility in proportion to u0ðcst11Þ. With
probability p, the entrepreneur does have an investment opportunity at
date t 1 1, in which case he will value depreciated equity by the market
price qt11 for the resalable fraction and by the effective replacement cost
qRt11 for the nonresalable fraction, and these yields increase utility in pro-
portion to u0ðcit11Þ.
Notice that because the effective replacement cost is lower than the
market price, the effective return on equity is lower just when the entre-
preneur is more in need of funds, namely, when an investment opportu-
nity arises and his marginal utility of consumption is higher (cit11 < c
s
t11).
That is, over and above aggregate risk, equity carries an idiosyncratic
risk: its effective return is negatively correlated with the idiosyncratic var-
iations in marginal utility that stem from the stochastic investment op-
portunities. Money is free from such idiosyncratic risk.
We are now in a position to consider the aggregate economy. The great
merit of the expressions for an investing entrepreneur’s consumption
and investment choices, cit and it, and a noninvesting entrepreneur’s con-
sumption and savings choices, cst , nst11, and m
s
t11, is that they are all linearThis content downloaded from 129.215.019.157 on November 08, 2019 02:35:05 AM
 use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
liquidity, business cycles, and monetary policy 000in start-of-period equity and money holdings nt and mt.11 Hence, aggrega-
tion is easy: we do not need to keep track of the distributions. Notice that
because workers do not choose to save, the aggregate holdings of equity
and money of the entrepreneurs are equal to the aggregate capital stock
Kt and money supply M. At the start of date t, a fraction p of Kt and M is
held by entrepreneurs who have an investment opportunity. From (18),
total investment It in new capital therefore satisfies
1 2 vqtð ÞIt 5 p b rt 1 lftqtð ÞKt 1 ptM½  2 1 2 bð Þ 1 2 ftð ÞlqRt Ktf g: (22)
Goods market clearing requires that total output (net of labor costs,
which equal the consumption of workers), rtKt, equals investment plus
the consumption of entrepreneurs. Using (17) and (20), we therefore have
rtKt 5 atKt
a 5 It 1 1 2 bð Þ
 rt 1 1 2 p 1 pftð Þlqt 1 p 1 2 ftð ÞlqRt½ Kt 1 ptMf g:
(23)
We still need to find the aggregate counterpart to portfolio equa-
tion (21). During period t, the investing entrepreneurs sell a fraction v of
their investment It, together with a fraction ft of their depreciated equity
holdings plKt, to the noninvesting entrepreneurs, so the stock of equity
held by the group of noninvesting entrepreneurs at the end of the period
is given by vIt 1 ftplKt 1 ð1 2 pÞlKt ; N st11. And by claim 2c we know
that this group also holds all themoney stock,M. The group’s savings port-
folio ðN st11,M Þ satisfies (21), which leads to
1 2 pð ÞEt rt11 1 lqt11ð Þ=qt 2 pt11=pt
rt11 1 qt11lð ÞN st11 1 pt11M
 
5 pEt
pt11=pt 2 rt11 1 ft11lqt11 1 1 2 ft11ð ÞlqRt11½ =qt
rt11 1 ft11lqt11 1 1 2 ft11ð ÞlqRt11½ N st11 1 pt11M
 
:
(24)
Equation (24) lies at the heart of themodel. When there is no investment
opportunity at date t 1 1, so that thepartial liquidity of equity does notmat-
ter, the return on equity, ðrt11 1 lqt11Þ=qt , exceeds the return on money,
pt11=pt : the left-hand side of (24) is positive. However, when there is an in-
vestment opportunity, the effective return on equity, ½rt11 1 ft11lqt111
ð1 2 ft11ÞlqRt11=qt , is less than the return on money: the right-hand side
of (24) is positive. These return differentials have to be weighted by the
respective probabilities andmarginal utilities. Note that because of the im-
pact of idiosyncratic risk on the right-hand side, the liquidity premium of11 From (19) and (20), the value of savings, qtnst11 1 ptm
s
t11, is linear in nt and mt, and the
reciprocal of the right-hand portfolio eq. (21) is homogeneous in (nst11, m
s
t11)—noting that
u0ðcÞ 5 1=c and (17) and (20) hold at t 1 1. See the appendix for further details in the
context of our full model.
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Allequity over money in the left-hand side may be substantial and may vary
through time.
Aside from the liquidity shock ft and the technology parameter At,
which follow an exogenous stationary Markov process, the only state var-
iable in this system is Kt, which evolves according to
Kt11 5 lKt 1 It : (25)
Restricting attention to a stationary price process, we can define the com-
petitive equilibrium recursively as a function ðrt , It , pt , qt , Kt11Þ of the aggre-
gate state ðKt , At , ftÞ that satisfies (11) and (22)–(25), together with the law
of motion of At and ft.
From these equations it can be seen that there are rich interactions
between quantities ðIt , Kt11Þ and asset prices ðpt , qtÞ. In this sense, our econ-
omy is similar to Keynes (1936) and Tobin (1969).12
In steady state, when at 5 a (the right-hand side of [12] with At 5 A)
and ft 5 f, capital stock K, investment I, and prices p and q satisfy
I 5 ð1 2 lÞK and
r 5 1 2 l 1 1 2 bð Þ r 1 l 1 2 p 1 pfð Þq 1 lp 1 2 fð ÞqR 1 b½ , (26)
1 2 lð Þ 1 2 vqð Þ 5 p b r 1 lfqð Þ 2 l 1 2 bð Þ 1 2 fð ÞqR 1 bb½ , (27)
1 2 pð Þ r=qð Þ 1 l 2 1
r 1 lqð Þx 1 b 5 p
1 2 r 1 lfq 1 l 1 2 fð ÞqR=q½ 
r 1 lfq 1 l 1 2 fð ÞqR½ x 1 b , (28)
where r 5 aK a21, b 5 pM=K , and x ; vð1 2 lÞ 1 ð1 2 p 1 pfÞl (the
steady-state fraction of equity held by noninvesting entrepreneurs at the
end of a period).
Equations (26)–(28) can be viewed as a simultaneous system in three
unknowns: the price of capital, q ; the gross profit rate on capital, r ; and
the ratio of real money balances to capital stock, b. Equations (26) and
(27) can be solved for r and b, each as affine functions of q, which, when
substituted into (28), yield a quadratic equation in q with a unique pos-
itive solution. Assumption 2 is sufficient to ensure that this solution lies
strictly above 1 (but below 1=v). Assumption 2 is the necessary and suf-
ficient condition for money to have value: p > 0.
As a prelude to the dynamic analysis that we undertake later on, notice
that the technology parameter A affects the steady-state system only
through the gross profit term r 5 aK a21. That is, a rise in the steady-state
value of A increases the capital stock K but does not affect q, the price of
capital. The price of money p increases to leave b 5 pM=K unchanged.12 Following the tradition of Hicks (1937), we see (23) and (24) as akin to the investment-
saving (IS) and liquidity preference–money supply (LM) equations—though we derived our
equations from the optimal choices of forward-looking agents who face financing constraints.
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liquidity, business cycles, and monetary policy 000It is interesting to compare our economy, in which the liquidity con-
straints (5) and (6) bind for investing entrepreneurs, to an economy with-
out such constraints. Consider steady states. Without the liquidity con-
straints, the economy would achieve first best: the price of capital would
equal its cost, 1, and the capital stock—say, K *—would equate the return
on capital, aK a21 1 l, to the agents’ common subjective return, 1=b. (See
claim 1.) We show below that in our constrained economy, the level of ac-
tivity—measured by the capital stock K—is strictly below K *. Because of
the borrowing constraint and the partial liquidity of equity, the economy
fails to transfer enough resources to the investing entrepreneurs to achieve
the first-best level of investment.
On account of the liquidity constraint, there is a wedge between the
marginal product of capital and the expected rate(s) of return on equity.
It turns out that the expected rate(s) of return on equity and the rate of
return on money all lie below the time preference. Intuitively, because
the rates of return on assets to savers are below their time preference rate,
they do not save enough to escape the liquidity constraint that they will
face when they have an opportunity to invest in the future.
Claim 3. Under assumptions 1 and2, in theneighborhoodof the steady-
state monetary economy,
a. the stock of capital Kt11 is less than in first best:
Kt11 < K * ⇔ Et at11K
a21
t11 1 l
 	
>
1
b
;
b. the expected rate of return on equity, contingent on not having an
investment opportunity in the next period, is lower than the time
preference rate:
Et
at11K a21t11 1 lqt11
qt
<
1
b
;
c. the expected rate of return on money is yet lower:
Et
pt11
pt
< Et
at11K a21t11 1 lqt11
qt
; and
d. the expected rate of return on equity, contingent on having an in-
vestment opportunity in the next period, is lower still:
Et
at11K a21t11 1 ft11lqt11 1 1 2 ft11ð ÞlqRt11
qt
< Et
pt11
pt
:Claim 3c and 3d can be understood in terms of (28), given that in
steady state q > 1 > qR : the numerators in (28) are both positive. The dif-
ference between the expected return on equity and money in claim 3c,This content downloaded from 129.215.019.157 on November 08, 2019 02:35:05 AM
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Allreflecting the liquidity premium, equals the nominal interest rate on
equity.13
In our monetary economy, there is a spectrum of interest rates. They
are, in descendingorder: the expectedmarginal product of capital, the time
preference rate, the expected rate of return on equity (contingent on the
saver not having an investment opportunity in the next period), the ex-
pected rate of return onmoney, and the expected rate of return on equity
contingent on the saver having an investment opportunity in the next pe-
riod. Thus, in our economy, the impact of asset markets on aggregate pro-
duction cannot be summarized by a single real interest rate. Equally, it
would be misleading to use the rates of returns onmoney or equity to cal-
ibrate the time preference rate.
The fact that the expected rates of return on equity and money are
both lower than the time preference rate justifies our earlier assertion that
workers will not choose to save by holding equity or money.14 (Of course,
if workers could borrow against their future labor income, they would do
so. But we have ruled this out.) In steady state, workers enjoy a constant
consumption equal to their wages.
The reason why an entrepreneur saves and workers do not is because
the entrepreneur is preparing for his next investment opportunity. And
the entrepreneur saves using money as well as equity, despite money’s
particularly low return, because he anticipates that hewill be liquidity con-
strained at the time of investment. Along a typical time path, he experi-
ences episodes without investment, during which he consumes part of his
saving. As the return on saving—on both equity and money—is less than
his time preference rate, the value of his net worth gradually shrinks, as
does his consumption. He expands again only at the time of investment.
In the aggregate picture, we do not see all this fine grain. But it is impor-
tant to realize that, even in steady state, the economy is made up of a myr-
iad of such individual histories.13 By the Fisher equation, the nominal interest rate on equity equals the net real return
on equity plus the inflation rate. But minus the inflation rate equals the net real return on
money. Hence, the nominal interest rate on equity equals the real return on equity minus
the return on money, i.e., the liquidity premium. Because our money is broad money (all
assets that are as liquid as fiat money), our nominal interest rate is akin to the interest rate
in Keynes (1936): the difference in the rate of return on partially liquid assets vs. that on
fully liquid assets.
14 Workers may save if they face their own investment opportunity shocks. Suppose, e.g.,
that each worker randomly faces a “health shock” that entails immediately spending some
fixed amount z to maintain her human capital. (Health insurance may cover some of the
cost, but the patient has tomake a copayment from her own pocket.) Then, if the resalability
of equity is low, a workermay choose to save entirely inmoney enough to cover the amount z.
The point is that even though the rate of return on equity is higher than that on money, on
account of the resalability constraint she would need to save more in equity than in money,
whichmay be less attractive given that the rate of return on equity is lower than her time pref-
erence rate. See Kiyotaki and Moore (2005b) for details.
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liquidity, business cycles, and monetary policy 000III. Dynamics and Numerical ExamplesTo examine the dynamics of our economy, we present numerical exam-
ples specifying a law of motion for productivity and liquidity ðAt , ftÞ. Sup-
pose that ðAt , ftÞ follow independent AR(1) processes such that at 5
g½ð1 2 gÞ=qð12gÞ=ðg1nÞðAtÞð11nÞ=ðg1nÞ (from [12]) and ft satisfy
at 2 a 5 ra at21 2 að Þ 1 εat , (29)
ft 2 f 5 rf ft21 2 fð Þ 1 εft , (30)
where ra and rf ∈ ð0, 1Þ. For calibration, we set ra 5 rf 5 0:95. The var-
iables εat and εft are independently and identically distributed innova-
tions of the levels of productivity and liquidity, which have mean zero
and are mutually independent. We present our numerical examples to
illustrate the qualitative features of our model rather than to be a precise
calibration. We consider one period to be one quarter and choose stan-
dard parameters that are broadly consistent with the existing literature:
b 5 0:99 (subjective discount factor), n 5 1 (inverse of the elasticity of
labor supply), l 5 0:97 (one minus depreciation rate), g 5 0:4 (share
of capital), and p 5 0:05 (arrival rate of investment opportunity). For
the parameters of the borrowing and resalability constraints, we choose
v 5 0:3 and f 5 0:2, so that the spread of the rates of return between
equity andmoney equals 3.1 percent annually and the ratio of real balances
to annual output equals one-third in thedeterministic steady state.15 Table 1
shows values in the deterministic steady state.
Figure 1 shows the impulse response function to a 1 percent increase
in At, which increases at by ð1 1 nÞ=ðg 1 nÞ 5 1:43 percent.
Because capital stock is predetermined and the labor market clears,
output increases by 1.43 percent (the same proportion as at). Then, from
the goods market equilibrium condition (23) in conjunction with (22),
we see that asset prices ðpt , qtÞ have to increase with productivity to raise
consumption and investment in line with output. Although investment
is more sensitive to the asset prices and thus increases proportionately
more than consumption, the aggregate consumption of both entrepre-
neurs and workers increases substantially (especially since workers’ con-
sumption is equal to their wage income). This is different from a first-best
allocation in which consumption would be much smoother than invest-
ment because,without thebinding liquidity constraints, consumptionwould
depend on permanent rather than current income. Also, in a first-best15 Note that in steady state, the rate of return on equity (contingent on the saver not hav-
ing an investment opportunity in thenext period) is between 0percent (the rate of return on
money) and 4 percent (the time preference rate). We choose the share of capital and depre-
ciation rate of capital to be a little higher than usual to emphasize the financing need of cap-
ital investment. See Ajello (2016) andDelNegro et al. (2017) for alternative calibration strat-
egies. The former relies on firm-level panel data, and the latter relies on Krishnamurthy and
Vissing-Jorgensen (2012) and financial market data.
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Allequilibrium, Tobin’s q would always equal unity and the value of money
would always equal zero, whereas in our monetary equilibrium with bind-
ing liquidity constraints, quantities and asset prices move together.
Now let us consider liquidity shocks. Figure 2 shows the impulse re-
sponse of quantities and asset prices when the resalability of the equity
drops from 0.2 to 0.06, a fall of 70 percent.
When the resalability of equity falls and only slowly recovers, the invest-
ing entrepreneurs are less able to finance down payment from selling
their equity holdings, and so investment decreases substantially. Capital
stock and output gradually decrease with persistently lower investment.
Also, savers now find money more attractive than equity (holding their
rates of return unchanged), given that they can resell a smaller fraction
of their equity holding when future investment opportunities arise (cete-
ris paribus, the numerator in the right-hand side of [24] rises as ft11 falls).
Thus, the value of money increases compared to the equity price to re-
store assetmarket equilibrium. This can be thought of as a flight to liquid-
ity—a flight from equity to money.
Notwithstanding this flight from equity, the real equity price tends to rise
with the fall in liquidity, even though the nominal equity price always falls.
One way to understand why is to think of the gap between Tobin’s q and
unity as ameasureof the tightness of the liquidity constraint, which increases
when the resalability of equity falls. Another way is to observe that, because
output is not initially affected (given full employment), consumption must
increase to maintain equilibrium in the goods market, and consumption
rises through the wealth effect of a rise in asset prices. This negative co-
movement between investment, consumption, and equity price is a short-
coming of our basic model—a shortcoming shared by many macroeco-
nomic models with flexible prices.16 We address this in the next section.
Note that, in contrast to ourmonetary equilibrium, a first-best allocation
would not react to the liquidity shock, as the liquidity constraint would not
be binding.IV. Full Model with Storage and GovernmentWenowpresent the fullmodel. Thenegative comovement between invest-
ment, consumption, and equity price in the basic model can be remedied
by augmenting themodel to include an alternative liquidmeans of saving:TABLE 1
Steady State
C/Y I/Y K/4Y pM/4Y q (r/q) 1 l 2 1
72% 28% 2.34 33% 1.14 3.1% annual16 Shi
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liquidity, business cycles, and monetary policy 000storage. Storage represents all the various means of short-term saving be-
sides money. For example, storage might be the holding of foreign assets
(though home citizens cannot borrow from foreigners or sell them equity).
Formally, storage is an alternative liquid investment technology available
to everyone, unlike the capital investment technology, which is available
to only a select subset of entrepreneurs each period. We find that, hav-
ing augmented our model to include storage, in response to a fall in the
resalability of equity, resources flow out of capital investment into storage
rather than into consumption. Loosely put, when financial markets are
disrupted, capital investment by selected entrepreneurs (towhomthe econ-
omy wants to funnel resources via financial markets) shrinks, whereas com-
mon storage investment expands. Interpreting storage as the holding of
foreign assets, we might say that there is a “capital flight.”
Specifically, suppose that an agent can store jt zt11 units of goods at date
t to obtain zt11 units of goods at date t 1 1, where zt11 must be nonnega-
tive. Although the storage technology has constant returns to scale at the
individual level, it has decreasing returns to scale in the aggregate:17 jt is
an increasing function of the aggregate quantity of storage Zt11,
jt 5 j Zt11ð Þ 5 Zt11
z0
 z
,  where z0, z > 0:
The second change to our basic model is to introduce the government.
Our goal here is merely to explore the effects on the economy of an exog-
enous governmentpolicy rule rather than toexplain governmentbehavior.
At the start of date t, suppose that the government holdsN gt equity. Unlike
entrepreneurs, the government cannot produce new capital. However,
it can engage in open-market operations to buy (resell) equity by issuing
(taking in)money—it has sole access to a costlessmoney-printing technol-
ogy. When buying equity, the government does not violate the private sec-
tor’s resalability constraints.18 We assume that N gt is not so large that the
private economy switches regimes—that is, we are still in an equilibrium
where the liquidity constraints bind for investing entrepreneurs andmoney
is valuable.
IfMt is the stock of money privately held by entrepreneurs at the start
of date t, then the government’s flow-of-funds constraint is given by
qt N
g
t11 2 lN
g
tð Þ 5 rtN gt 1 pt Mt11 2 Mtð Þ 5 rtN gt 1 mt 2 1ð ÞBt , (31)
where Bt ; ptMt are real balances and mt ; Mt11=Mt is the money supply
growth rate. That is, equity purchases are met by the dividends from17 Instead of assuming decreasing returns in the aggregate, we could introduce another
factor of production (such as labor) that is needed for storage besides the goods input.
However, it simplifies the exposition not to do so.
18 When reselling equity, the government is also subject to the resalability constraint:
N
g
t11 ≥ ð1 2 ftÞlN gt .
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Allits equity holdings plus seigniorage revenues. Since the government is a
large agent, at least relative to each of the private agents, open-market op-
erations will affect the prices pt and qt.
We will suppose that the government follows a rule for its open-market
operations:
N
g
t11
K
5 wa
at 2 a
a
1 wf
ft 2 f
f
, (32)
where wa and wf are policy parameters and K is the capital stock in steady
state. This equation is the government’s feedback rule: it chooses the
size of its open-market operation (the ratio of its equity holding to the
steady-state capital stock) as a function of the proportional deviations
of productivity and liquidity from their steady-state levels.19
The earlier analysis carries through, with obviousmodifications. See the
appendix for details. The total supply of equity (which by construction is
equal to the aggregate capital stock) equals the sum of the government’s
holding and the aggregate holding by entrepreneurs (denoted by Nt11):
Kt11 5 N
g
t11 1 Nt11: (33)
Workers consume all their disposable income, and, given the formof their
preferences in (8), government policy does not affect their labor supply.
Equations (22)–(24) are modified to
12 vqtð ÞIt 5 p b rt 1 lftqtð ÞNt 1Bt 1Zt½  2 12 bð Þ 12 ftð ÞlqRt Ntf g, (34)
rtKt 5 atK
a
t 5 It 1 j Zt11ð ÞZt11 2 Zt 1 1 2 bð Þ
 rt 1 1 2 p 1 pftð Þlqt 1 p 1 2 ftð ÞlqRt½ Nt 1 Bt 1 Ztf g,
(35)
1 2 pð ÞEt rt11 1 lqt11ð Þ=qt 2 Bt11= mtBtð Þ
rt11 1 lqt11ð ÞN st11 1 Bt11 1 Zt11
 
5 pEt
Bt11= mtBtð Þ 2 rt11 1 ft11lqt11 1 1 2 ft11ð ÞlqRt11½ =qt
rt11 1 ft11lqt11 1 1 2 ft11ð ÞlqRt11½ N st11 1 Bt11 1 Zt11
 
,
(36)
1 2 pð ÞEt rt11 1 lqt11ð Þ=qt 2 1=j Zt11ð Þð Þ
rt11 1 lqt11ð ÞN st11 1 Bt11 1 Zt11
 
5 pEt
1=j Zt11ð Þð Þ 2 rt11 1 ft11lqt11 1 1 2 ft11ð ÞlqRt11½ =qt
rt11 1 ft11lqt11 1 1 2 ft11ð ÞlqRt11½ N st11 1 Bt11 1 Zt11
 
,
(37)19 For simplicity, we turn a blind eye to the fact that N gt11 may be negative. This could be
avoided by assuming that the government has a sufficiently large holding of private equity
in steady state (or by assuming that the government’s feedback rule is subject to the non-
negativity constraint onN gt11). The analysis and results that we report belowwould not be sub-
stantially different.
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liquidity, business cycles, and monetary policy 000where N st11 5 vIt 1 ftplNt 1 ð1 2 pÞlNt 1 lN gt 2 N gt11. In investment
equation (34), entrepreneurs use their money and storage and the resal-
able portion of their equity—net of their consumption—to finance the
down payment. In goods market equilibrium (35), output (net of the
workers’ consumption) equals the sum of capital investment, storage in-
vestment, and the entrepreneurs’ consumption. Portfolio equation (36)
gives the trade-off between holding equity and money, and new portfolio
equation (37) gives the trade-off between holding equity and storage.
Restricting attention to a stationary price process, we can define the
competitive equilibrium recursively as a function ðrt , It , Bt , qt , Zt11, Kt11,
Nt11,N
g
t11, mtÞ of the aggregate state ðKt , Zt ,N gt , at , ftÞ that satisfies (11), (25),
and (31)–(37) together with the exogenous law of motion of ðat , ftÞ.20
How does the presence of storage, as an alternative means of liquid
saving, alter the impulse responses? Figure 3 compares the impulse re-
sponses to a liquidity shock in the model with storage (solid lines) and the
model without storage (dotted lines, taken from fig. 2). We choose a stor-
age technology that has close to constant returns to scale (z 5 0:0001)
and is such that the steady-state level of storage (z0 5 0:5) ismodest (5per-
cent) compared to the steady-state capital stock (K 5 10:0). A storage
technology that has close to constant returns leads to volatile storage in-
vestment: this helps consumption to move with investment. However, we
would not want to go all the way to constant returns because then the
steady-state ratio of real balances to storagewould be indeterminate. There
is no change in the deterministic steady state (except that the liquidity is
provided by bothmoney and storage), becausemoney and storage are per-
fect substitutes in steady state.
In response to a fall in the resalability of equity, storage increases sharply
and investment falls more significantly than the economy without storage,
leading to amore significant fall in output. Importantly, consumption can
now also fall along with investment, as output is soaked up by the sharp
rise in storage.
Also, money and storage are close substitutes, with expected rates of re-
turn close tounity, whereas the liquidity premiumof equity has to behigher
to compensate for its lower resalability. As a consequence, the flight to li-
quidity induces the equity price to fall somewhat, at least initially.
Taking these findings together, we see that the presence of an alterna-
tive liquid means of saving has overcome the shortcomings of our basic
model. Quantities (investment and consumption) and stock price move
together, as storage serves as a buffer stock to absorb output and stabilize
the value of money.20 If there were a one-time lump sum transfer of money to the entrepreneurs (a helicop-
ter drop), then aggregate quantities would not change in our economy given that prices
and wages are flexible. The consumption and investment of individual entrepreneurs would
be affected, however, because there would be some redistribution.
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liquidity, business cycles, and monetary policy 000How might the government, through its central bank, conduct open-
market operations in response to the liquidity shock? A first-best allocation
wouldnot be affectedby a liquidity shock.With this benchmark inmind, in
our monetary economy the central bank can use open-market operations
to offset the effects of the liquidity shock, by setting the feedback rule co-
efficient wf to be negative in (32). That is, the central bank can counteract
the negative shock by purchasing equity withmoney to—at least partially—
restore the liquidity of investing entrepreneurs. Figure 4 compares the im-
pulse responses of the economywith this policy rule (wf 5 20:1; solid lines)
and without (wf 5 0; dotted lines, taken from the solid lines in fig. 3).
The central bank’s purchases of equity with money cause real balances
to increase sharply, notwithstanding the relatively stable price of money.
Storage increases less than in the economy without the policy interven-
tion. Investment falls initially by almost 40 percent—almost as much as
in the case of no policy, because at the time of the shock the investing en-
trepreneurs’ portfolios are predetermined. However, in the subsequent
periods, investing entrepreneurs (most of whom were savers previously)
have a larger proportion of liquid assets thanks to the policy intervention,
and investment recovers to a level of 20 percent below the steady state.
Thus, capital stock and output do not fall as much as in the economy with-
out intervention.
After the initial purchase of equity, government runs a surplus because
equity yields a higher return. It uses this surplus to reduce the money
supply by setting mt < 1. Because this deflationary policy rewards money
holders, the flight to liquidity is more pronounced: the equity price falls
as a result.
In contrast, howmight the central bank use open-market operations in
response to a productivity shock? Once more taking a first-best allocation
as a benchmark, the problem of our laissez-faire monetary economy ap-
pears to be that investment does not react enough to productivity shocks
and consumption is not smooth enough. Here the central bank can pro-
vide liquidity procyclically to accommodate productivity shocks, by setting
the feedback coefficient ofwa to be positive in (32). Figure 5 compares the
impulse response functions of the laissez-faire monetary economy with
an accommodating monetary policy (wa 5 0:2). As productivity rises by
1.43 percent, the central bank buys equity with money to provide an addi-
tional 3 percent liquidity. Entrepreneurs hold more money and less illiq-
uid equity and thus invest more. Investment increases by 1.1 percent in
the periods immediately following the shock, rather than increasing by
0.6 percent as in the economy without the intervention. But whereas in-
vestment and hence capital stock and output all increase more because
of the policy, storage increases less.
The efficacy of these open-market operations relies on the purchase of
an asset—here, equity—which is only partially resalable and hence earns
a nontrivial liquidity premium. If the liquidity premium of short-termThis content downloaded from 129.215.019.157 on November 08, 2019 02:35:05 AM
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Allgovernment bonds is very low (as in Japan since the late 1990s and many
other advanced economies since late 2008), then traditional open-market
operations will only serve to change the composition of broad money and
will have limited effects. Theunorthodoxpolicy of the Federal ReserveBank
during the recent financial crisis, such as the Term Securities Lending Fa-
cility, was an attempt to increase liquidity by supplying treasury bills against
only partially resalable securities, such as mortgage-backed securities.V. Related Literature and Final RemarksWehope tohave succeeded in constructing amodel ofmoney and liquidity
in the tradition of Keynes (1936) and Tobin (1969). The two key equations
of our model, (23) and (24)—which are generalized in (35)–(37)—have
the flavor of the Keynesian system. We follow Tobin in placing empha-
sis on the spectrum of liquidity across different classes of asset. Also, To-
bin’s q theory finds echo in our model through the central role played
by the equity price q : driving the feedback from asset markets to the rest
of the economy. Our policy analysis—open-market operations change
the liquidity mix of the private sector’s asset holdings—parallels that in
Metzler (1951). Perhaps, with its focus on liquidity, our framework harks
back to an earlier tradition of interpreting Keynes and has less in common
with the New Keynesian literature, with its emphasis on sticky prices, that
has been dominant in the past few decades.
This paper is part of the recent literature onmacroeconomics withfinan-
cial frictions that includesBernanke andGertler (1989); Kiyotaki andMoore
(1997); Holmstrom and Tirole (1998); Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist
(1999); and more recently Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2014).21 Natu-
rally, the common thread of this literature has been some form of borrow-
ing constraint, akin to our v constraint.Our innovation here is to combine
it with the f constraint, the resalability constraint. We have shown that the
presence of these two constraints opens up thepossibility for fiatmoney to
circulate, to lubricate the transfer of goods from savers to investors. There
is a wedge between money and other assets that arises out of the assumed
difference in their resalability.21 Of these, Holmstrom and Tirole (1998) is perhaps the closest to the present paper.
There, liquidity refers to the instrument used for transferring wealth across periods, in par-
ticular by firms arranging in advance to meet any future needs for additional finance (when
they may hit a borrowing constraint). This liquidity is supplied up front by the firms them-
selves, possibly through intermediaries. That is, firms hold claims against each other. Firms
can issue fully state-contingent claims so that they can mutually insure against idiosyncratic
shocks to their future financing needs. Holmstrom and Tirole ask whether the private mar-
ket supplies enough liquidity in aggregate and what role there may be for public interven-
tion. Because full state contingency is allowed in their model, there is no need for private
paper to circulate. Hence, even if there were some impediment to the resale of private paper
(along the lines of our f being less than one), it would not matter. See also Holmstrom and
Tirole (2001, 2011). Surveys can be found in Gertler and Kiyotaki (2011); Brunnermeier,
Eisenbach, and Sannikov (2013); and Gertler, Kiyotaki, and Prestipino (2016).
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liquidity, business cycles, and monetary policy 000Wedges between assets can be generated in other ways. In limited-
participation models, agents may have different access to asset markets.22
Modelswith spatially separatedmarkets—islandmodels—assume that agents
cannot visit all markets within the period, which limits trade across assets.
Some models combine geographical separation with asynchronization,
where agents have access to asset markets at different times.23 If the as-
sumption of competitivemarkets is dropped, as inmatchingmodels, assets
can exhibit different degrees of resalability.24 And there is a long tradition
in the banking and finance literature that, implicitly or explicitly, has to do
with the limited resalability of securities, dating back at least to Diamond
and Dybvig (1983).25
Our model abstracts from private banks as separate agents who supply
liquid paper. Instead, all our private assets are partially liquid to the same
degree, and all our entrepreneurs serve as financial intermediaries by si-
multaneously providing funds for others’ capital investment and raising
funds for their own. That is to say, we have amalgamated the classical role
of a banker (investing in financial assets) with the classical role of an en-
trepreneur (investing in productive assets). In the context of this abstrac-
tion, a fall in the resalability of private assets corresponds to a disruptionof
the financial system.
We should end by stressing that if, in particular, our model is to be used
for proper policy analysis, then considerably more research is needed.
While it might be argued that our v-f framework has the virtue of simplic-
ity, the borrowing and resalability constraints as they stand are too stylized
in nature, too reduced form. The borrowing constraint can be rational-
ized by invoking a moral-hazard argument—namely, to produce future
output from new capital requires the specific skill of the investing entre-
preneur, and he can renege on his promises. But the resalability constraint
requires more modeling, not least because we need to understand where22 See, e.g., Allen and Gale (1994, 2007).
23 See, e.g., Townsend (1987), Townsend and Wallace (1987), Freeman (1996a, 1996b),
and Green (1999).
24 Matchingmodels that canbeused for policy analysis includeShi (1997),Lagos andWright
(2005), Nosal and Rocheteau ([2011] 2017), and Lagos, Rocheteau, and Wright (2017).
25 For attempts to incorporate banking into standard business cycle models, see, e.g.,
Williamson (1987), Gertler and Karadi (2011), Gertler and Kiyotaki (2011), and Gertler
et al. (2016).
There is a large empirical literature on financial frictions. One strand constructs simple
indicators of financial frictions at the firm level using balance sheet or other types of firm-
level data. The challenge here is to separate firms that cannot invest because of financial
frictions from firms not wanting to invest because prospects do not look good; see, e.g.,
Farre-Mensa and Ljungqvist (2016). Another strand of the literature uses pseudonatural
experiments: identify two groups of firms that are similar in their prospects and demand
shocks but different in their financial frictions. This method has been applied to the recent
financial crisis to identify the real effects (employment and/or investment) of credit
shocks faced by firms; see, e.g., Almeida et al. (2012) and Chodorow-Reich (2014).
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Allthe liquidity shocks, the shocks to f, come from.26 Can policies be devised
that directly dampen these shocks (or even raise the average value of f),
rather than merely dealing with their effects?
To analyze the effects of open-market operations over the business cycle,
we assumed that the government can commit to a policy. But can it? This
question calls for further modeling, too, because if the government could
commit to, say, a deflationary monetary policy that followed the Friedman
rule (set the real return on money to equal agents’ subjective discount
rate), then it would in effect be using its taxation powers to substitute per-
fect public commitment for imperfect private commitment. In the long
run, can the government be trusted more than the private sector? And
to what extent do future tax liabilities crowd out a private agent’s ability
to issue credible promises to others?27 These thorny issues warrant much
careful thinking.Appendix
A. Proof of Claim 1
We construct a steady-state equilibrium in which inequalities (5), (6), and (10)
do not bind. From (7), we need q 5 1. (If q were strictly larger than one, invest-
ing entrepreneurs would invest arbitrarily large amounts and [5] would bind. If q
were strictly smaller than one, investing entrepreneurs would not invest at all and
there would be no capital stock.) Given q 5 1, it is immaterial to an entrepre-
neur whether he has an investment opportunity—so the missing insurance mar-
ket does not matter—and the choice of consumption versus investment/saving
of all the agents implies
1 5 b r 1 lð Þ: (A1)
Also, p 5 0. (If p were strictly positive, then with [6] not binding we would
have 1 5 bðpt11=ptÞ, which is not consistent with a constant money supply.)
Equilibrium in the capital, labor, and goods markets implies
r 5 gA
L
K
 12g
,
w 5 1 2 gð ÞA K
L
 g
5 qLn,
AK gL12g 5 C 1 Cw 1 1 2 lð ÞK ,26 Kiyotaki andMoore (2003) show how the resalability constraint can arise endogenously
as a result of adverse selection and how securitization may mitigate the adverse selection.
Other macroeconomic models of adverse selection in asset markets include Eisfeldt (2004),
Moore (2010) Kurlat (2013), Guerrieri and Shimer (2014), and Chang (2018).
27 A related question would be, If the government has a superior power to force private
agents to pay, why not provide them with finance directly?
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liquidity, business cycles, and monetary policy 000where C and Cw are aggregate consumption of entrepreneurs and workers. These
are the conditions for a first-best allocation.
We need to verify that under condition 1, inequalities (5), (6), and (10) do not
bind.With q 5 1 and p 5 0, inequality (5) for an investing entrepreneur becomes
rnt 2 ct 5 nt11 2 lnt ≥ 1 2 vð Þit 2 flnt :
Aggregating this inequality across all the investing entrepreneurs and recall-
ing that the arrival of an investment opportunity is independently and identically
distributed across entrepreneurs and through time, we have
p rN 2 Cð Þ ≥ 1 2 vð ÞI 2 flpN ,
where N is aggregate equity of entrepreneurs. Using the budget constraint of
entrepreneurs C 5 ðr 2 1 1 lÞN and equity market equilibrium K 5 N w 1 N
(where N w is aggregate equity of workers), we can write this inequality as
p 1 2 lð ÞN ≥ 1 2 vð Þ 1 2 lð Þ N 1 N wð Þ 2 flpN : (A2)
Given that condition 1 is a strict inequality, (A2) is satisfied as long asN w is not too
large. That is to say, there is a continuum of equilibria indexed by N w as long
as (A2) is satisfied. QEDB. Derivation of Consumption and Portfolio Equations
Let Vtðmt , nt , ztÞ be the value function of the entrepreneur who holds money, eq-
uity, and storage ðmt , nt , ztÞ at the beginning of the period t before meeting an
opportunity to invest with probability p. The Bellman equation can be written as
Vt mt , nt , ztð Þ 5 p  max
cit , it ,m
i
t11, n
i
t11, z
i
t11
s:t: 5, 6, 7ð Þ
ln cit 1 bEt Vt11 m
i
t11, n
i
t11, z
i
t11ð Þ½ f g
1 1 2 pð Þ  max
cst ,m
s
t11, n
s
t11, z
s
t11
s:t: 5, 6, 7ð Þ, it 5 0
ln cst 1 bEt Vt11 m
s
t11, n
s
t11, z
s
t11ð Þ½ f g:
Solving the flow-of-funds conditions for cst and cit , we find that the Bellman equa-
tion is
Vt mt , nt , ztð Þ 5 p  max
mit11,n
i
t11,z
i
t11
flnð r t 1 ftlqt 1 1 2 ftð ÞlqRt½ nt 1 ptmt 1 zt 2 qRt nit11
2 ptm
i
t11 2 jt z
i
t11Þ 1 bEt V t11 mit11, nit11, zit11ð Þ½ g
1 1 2 pð Þ  max
mst11,n
s
t11,z
s
t11
flnðð r t 1 lqtÞnt 1 ptmt 1 zt 2 qtnst112 ptmst11
2 jt z
s
t11Þ 1 bEt V t11 mst11, nst11, zst11ð Þ½ g:
Let Rmt11 and Rzt11 be the rates of return on money and storage from date t to
date t 1 1, and let Rhh
0
t11 be the implied rate of returns on equity for the entrepre-
neur when his type is h (h 5 i for investing and h 5 s for saving or noninvesting)
at date t and h0 at date t 1 1; that is,This content downloaded from 129.215.019.157 on November 08, 2019 02:35:05 AM
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AllRmt115
pt11
pt
, Rzt11 5
1
jt
,
Rsst115
rt11 1 lqt11
qt
, Rsit11 5
rt11 1 lft11qt11 1 l 1 2 ft11ð ÞqRt11
qt
,
Rist115
rt11 1 lqt11
qRt
, Riit11 5
rt11 1 lft11qt11 1 l 1 2 ft11ð ÞqRt11
qRt
:
Then the first-order conditions that we need to confirm are
1 5 Et p
bcit
ciit11
Riit11 1 1 2 pð Þ bc
i
t
cist11
Rist11
 
, (A3)
1 > Et p
bcit
ciit11
Rmt11 1 1 2 pð Þ bc
i
t
cist11
Rmt11
 
, (A4a)
1 > Et p
bcit
ciit11
Rzt11 1 1 2 pð Þ bc
i
t
cist11
Rzt11
 
, (A4b)
1 5 Et p
bcst
csit11
Rsit11 1 1 2 pð Þ bc
s
t
csst11
Rsst11
 
, (A5)
1 5 Et p
bcst
csit11
Rmt11 1 1 2 pð Þ bc
s
t
csst11
Rmt11
 
, (A6)
1 5 Et p
bcst
csit11
Rzt11 1 1 2 pð Þ bc
s
t
csst11
Rzt11
 
, (A7)
where cht is date t consumption of the entrepreneur of typeh and chh
0
t11 is date t 1 1
consumption of the entrepreneur when his type is h at date t and h0 at date t 1 1.
We guess that
cit 5 1 2 bð Þ rt 1 ftlqt 1 1 2 ftð ÞlqRt½ nt 1 ptmt 1 ztf g,
cst 5 1 2 bð Þ rt 1 lqtð Þnt 1 ptmt 1 ztf g,
nit11 5 b rt 1 ftlqt 1 1 2 ftð ÞlqRt½ nt 1 ptmt 1 ztf g=qRt ,
mit11 5 0, z
i
t11 5 0,
nst11 5 bfnt rt 1 lqtð Þnt 1 ptmt 1 zt½ =qt ,
mst11 5 bfmt rt 1 lqtð Þnt 1 ptmt 1 zt½ =pt ,
zst11 5 bfzt rt 1 lqtð Þnt 1 ptmt 1 zt½ =jt ,
ciit11 5 1 2 bð Þ rt11 1 ft11lqt11 1 1 2 ft11ð ÞlqRt½ nit11,
cist11 5 1 2 bð Þ rt11 1 lqt11ð Þnit11,
csit11 5 1 2 bð Þ rt11 1 ft11lqt11 1 1 2 ft11ð ÞlqRt½ nst11 1 pt11mst11 1 zst11f g,
csst11 5 1 2 bð Þ rt11 1 lqt11ð Þnst11 1 pt11mst11 1 zst11f g,This content downloaded from 129.215.019.157 on November 08, 2019 02:35:05 AM
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liquidity, business cycles, and monetary policy 000where fmt ; ptmst11=ðptmst11 1 qtnst111 jt zst11Þ, fnt ; qtnst11=ðptmst11 1 qtnst111 jt zst11Þ,
and fzt ; jt zst11=ðptmst11 1 qtnst11 1 jt zst11Þ are the date t shares of money, equity,
and storage in the portfolio of the noninvesting entrepreneur. Under this guess,
we learn that
ciit11
cit
5 bRiit11 and 
cist11
cit
5 bRist11,
and thus (A3) is satisfied. We can write (A4a) and (A4b) as
1 > Et p
Rmt11
Riit11
1 1 2 pð Þ Rmt11
Rist11
 
, (A8a)
1 > Et p
Rzt11
Riit11
1 1 2 pð Þ Rzt11
Rist11
 
: (A8b)
We also learn that
csit11
cst
5 b fmtRmt11 1 fntR
si
t11 1 fztR zt11ð Þ,
csst11
cst
5 b fmtRmt11 1 fntR
ss
t11 1 fztR zt11ð Þ:Thus, (A5)–(A7) become
1 5 Et
pRsit11
fmtRmt11 1 fntR
si
t11 1 fztRzt11
1
1 2 pð ÞRsst11
fmtRmt11 1 fntR
ss
t11 1 fztRzt11
 
, (A9)
1 5 Et
pRmt11
fmtRmt11 1 fntR
si
t11 1 fztRzt11
1
1 2 pð ÞRmt11
fmtRmt11 1 fntR
ss
t11 1 fztRzt11
 
, (A10)
1 5 Et
pRzt11
fmtRmt11 1 fntR
si
t11 1 fztRzt11
1
1 2 pð ÞRzt11
fmtRmt11 1 fntR
ss
t11 1 fztRzt11
 
: (A11)
We are seeking values of ð fmt , fnt , fztÞ that solve these equations, but we have only
two degrees of freedom because fmt 1 fnt 1 fzt 5 1. However, fnt times the right-
hand side of (A9) plus fmt times the right-hand side of (A10) plus fzt times the
right-hand side of (A11) equals 1, so one of (A9)–(A11) is not independent. Sub-
tracting (A10) from (A9) and rearranging, we get
pEt
Rmt11 2 Rsint11
fmtRmt11 1 fntR
si
t11 1 fztRzt11
 
5 1 2 pð ÞEt R
ss
t11 2 Rmt11
fmtRmt11 1 fntR
ss
t11 1 fztRzt11
 
, (A12a)
pEt
Rzt11 2 Rsint11
fmtRmt11 1 fntR
si
t11 1 fztRzt11
 
5 1 2 pð ÞEt R
ss
t11 2 Rzt11
fmtRmt11 1 fntR
ss
t11 1 fztRzt11
 
: (A12b)
These are equivalent to (36) and (37). Because qt > 1 > qRt in our equilibrium,
we always haveThis content downloaded from 129.215.019.157 on November 08, 2019 02:35:05 AM
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AllRiit11 > R
si
t11 and Rist11 > Rsst11:
In the neighborhood of the steady-state equilibrium, we have
Riit11 > R
ss
t11 > Rmt11 and Rsst11 > Rzt11:
Thus, comparing (A10) and (A11) with (A8), we learn that inequalities (A8) hold
in the neighborhood of the steady state.
C. Proof of Claim 2
From (26)–(28), the steady-state value of ðr , b, qÞ solves
br 2 1 2 bð Þb 5 12 l 1 pl 12 bð Þ1 2 f
1 2 v
 
1 1 2 bð Þ 12 p 12 f
12 v
 
lq,
(A13)
pbr 1 pbb 5 1 2 l 1 pl 1 2 bð Þ 1 2 f
1 2 v
 
1 2 vqð Þ 2 pblfq, (A14)
12 pð Þ r 2 1 2 lð Þq
r 1 lq 1 b=xð Þ 5 pl
1 2 fð Þ= 1 2 vð Þ½  q 2 1ð Þ 2 r 2 1 2 lð Þq½ 
r 1 lq 1 b=xð Þ2 l 12 fð Þ= 12 vð Þ½  q 2 1ð Þ : (A15)
From (A13) and (A14), we have
1 2 1 2 bð Þ
p pb
 !
br
b
 !
5
1
1
 !
k 1
l 1 2 bð Þ 1 2 phð Þ
2 v^ 1 lpb 1 2 hð Þ
 
 !
q,
where h 5 ð1 2 fÞ=ð1 2 vÞ, k 5 1 2 l 1 lpð1 2 bÞh, and v^ 5 ð1 2 l 1 lphÞv.
Thus,
pbr 5 1 2 b 1 pbð Þk 1 1 2 bð Þ lpb 1 2 pð Þh 2 v^
 q, (A16)
pb 5 1 2 pð Þk 2 lp 2 lp b 1 p 2 pbð Þh 1 v^
 q: (A17)
Becauselp 2 lpðb1 p2 pbÞh 1 v^ 5 lpð1 2 pÞð1 2 bÞh 1 lpf 1 vð1 2 lÞ > 0,
we have
b > 0 iff  q <
1 2 pð Þk
lp 2 lp b 1 p 2 pbð Þh 1 v^ ; q^: (A18)
Then there is a monetary equilibrium with financing constraint only if q^ > 1, or
1 2 lð Þv 1 lpf < 1 2 lð Þ 1 2 pð Þ,
that is, condition 1 for a first-best allocation is violated.
Equation (A15) can be written as
r 2 1 2 lð Þq½  r 2 1 2 lð Þq 1 q 1 b
x
 
5 lh q 2 1ð Þ r 2 1 2 lð Þq 1 p q 1 b
x
  
:
(A19)This content downloaded from 129.215.019.157 on November 08, 2019 02:35:05 AM
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0 5 W qð Þ
; lpbh q 2 1ð Þ ð 1 2 b 1 pbð Þk 1 q 1 2 bð Þ lpbh 2 v^ 	 2 pbk
  
 l 1 2 phð Þ 1 v^
  1 pb 1 2 pð Þ k 1 q lpbh 2 v^ 	
 Þ
2 1 2 b 1 pbð Þk 1 q 1 2 bð Þ lpbh 2 v^ 	 2 pbk
  
 ð 1 2 b 1 pbð Þk 1 q 1 2 bð Þ lpbh 2 v^ 	 2 pbk
  
 l 1 2 phð Þ 1 v^
  1 b 1 2 pð Þ k 1 q lpbh 2 v^ 	
 Þ:
(A20)
Then we learn that
W 1ð Þ52 12 bð Þ k 1 lpbh 2 v^ 	2 12 bð Þ l 12 phð Þ 12 vð Þ1 v½ 1 b 12 pð Þf g < 0:
Therefore, the necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of mone-
tary equilibrium with q ∈ ð1, q^Þ is
0 < W q^ð Þ: (A21)
Using (A18), inequality (A21) becomes
0 < blh 1 2 p 2 xð Þ x 2 b 1 2 pð Þ 1 pb 1 2 pð Þ½  2 x 2 b 1 2 pð Þ½ xk
5pb2lh 1 2 pð Þ 1 2 p 2 xð Þ
2 x 2 b 1 2 pð Þ½  1 2 l 1 lphð Þ x 2 bl 1 2 pð Þ 1 2 fð Þ½ :
Multiplying both sides by 1 2 v, we get the condition
0 < pb2l 1 2 pð Þ 1 2 fð Þ 1 2 lð Þ 1 2 pð Þ 2 1 2 lð Þv 2 plf½ 
1 b 2 lð Þ 1 2 pð Þ 2 1 2 lð Þv 2 plf½  1 2 lð Þ 1 2 vð Þ 1 lp 1 2 fð Þ½ 
 l 1 2 bð Þ 1 2 pð Þ 1 1 2 lð Þv 1 l p 1 b 2 pbð Þf½ :
This is assumption 2 in the text. Therefore, under assumption 2, we have a com-
petitive equilibrium in which fiat money has a positive value (claim 2a) and qt >
1 (claim 2b). Claim 2c directly follows from inequality (A4a) or (A8a), which we
proved above given that qt > 1 in the neighborhood of the steady state. QED
D. Proof of Claim 3
Claim 3a.—Under assumption 2, we have ð1 2 lÞv 1 plf < ð1 2 lÞð1 2 pÞ.
Thus, we have
∂ RHS of   26ð Þ
∂q
5 l 1 2 bð Þ 1 2 p 1 pf 2 p 1 2 f
1 2 v
v
 
> l 1 2 bð Þ pf
1 2 lð Þ 1 2 vð Þ > 0:
Given q > 1 and b ≥ 0, we have from (26)This content downloaded from 129.215.019.157 on November 08, 2019 02:35:05 AM
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Allr 5 RHS of   26ð Þ > RHS of   26ð Þjq51,b50
5 1 2 l 1 1 2 bð Þ r 1 lð Þ,
or
r 1 l >
1
b
:
QED
Claim 3d.—Suppose that claim 3d is not true. Then
r 1 flq 1 1 2 fð ÞlqR
q
≥ 1: (A22)
Because qR < 1 < q, this implies that
r
q
1 l > 1:
But then the left-hand side of (28) is strictly positive, whereas the right-hand side
is nonpositive by (A22). This is a contradiction. QED
Claim 3c.—From (28), claim 3d implies that ðr=qÞ 1 l > 1. QED
Claim 3b.—Using qR < 1 < q in (28), we have
1 2 pð Þ r 2 1 2 lð Þq½  > p q 2 r 2 lfq 2 l 1 2 fð ÞqR½ ,
or
r 2 1 2 lð Þq > plh q 2 1ð Þ > 0:
Hence, given b > 0, from (A19) it follows that
D D 1 1ð Þ
D 1 p
< lh 1 2
1
q
 
,
where D ; ðr=qÞ 1 l 2 1 > 0 by claim 3c. But from (A16),
1
q
5
1
1 2 b 1 pbð Þk pb D 1 1 2 lð Þ 2 1 2 bð Þ lpb 1 2 pð Þh 2 v^

  
:
Substituting this into the above inequality, we get
D D 1 1ð Þ
lh D 1 pð Þ 1
pbD
1 2 b 1 pbð Þk
< 1 2
1
1 2 b 1 pbð Þk pb 1 2 lð Þ 2 1 2 bð Þ lpb 1 2 pð Þh 2 v^

  
:
The left-hand side of this inequality is increasing in D.
Suppose that claim 3b is not true; that is, D ≥ ð1 2 bÞ=b. Then
1 2 b
lhb 1 2 b 1 pbð Þ 1
p 1 2 bð Þ
1 2 b 1 pbð Þk
< 1 2
1
1 2 b 1 pbð Þk pb 1 2 lð Þ 2 1 2 bð Þ lpb 1 2 pð Þh 2 v^
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liquidity, business cycles, and monetary policy 000Multiplying this inequality through by lhbð1 2 b 1 pbÞk, we have
1 2 bð Þ 1 2 l 1 lp 1 2 bð Þh½  1 lhbp 1 2 bð Þ
< lhb 1 2 b 1 pbð Þ 1 2 l 1 lp 1 2 bð Þh½  2 lhb2p 1 2 lð Þ
1l2h2b2p 1 2 pð Þ 1 2 bð Þ 2 lhb 1 2 bð Þ 1 2 l 1 lphð Þv:
Canceling the two terms that do not have factor 1 2 b and dividing by 1 2 b, we
get
1 2 l 1 lphð Þ 1 2 lhb 1 2 vð Þ½  < 0
or
1 2 l 1 lphð Þ 1 2 lb 1 2 fð Þ½  < 0:
This is a contradiction. QEDReferences
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